This paper examines the Hogan-Rosellón-Vogelsang (2007) (HRV) incentive mechanism for transmission expansion, and tests it for different network topologies. This new mechanism is based upon redefining transmission output in terms of point-to-point transactions or financial transmission rights (FTRs) and applies Vogelsang's (2001) incentive-regulation logic that proposes rebalancing the variable and fixed parts of a two-part tariff to promote efficient, long-term expansion. We analyze three main topics: first, the behavior of cost functions for distinct network topologies; second, the HRV regulatory approach (incorporated into an MPEC Problem and tested for a three-node network), and third an application to a simplified network. The results suggest that the mechanism is generally suited as an incentive tool for network extensions.
Introduction

Motivation
This paper analyzes a new tool for transmission expansion called the Hogan-Rosellón-Vogelsang (2007) (HRV) incentive mechanism. It is based upon redefining the output of transmission in terms of point-to-point transactions or financial transmission rights (FTRs) and applies the incentive-regulation logic in Vogelsang (2001) that proposes rebalancing the variable and fixed parts of a two-part tariff to promote efficient, long-term expansion. Roughly speaking, Vogelsang (2001) is by its nature relevant for radial networks only, while HRV is designed to deal with expansions within meshed networks.
The debate how to foster efficient transmission extension is one of the main concerns in restructured electricity markets around the world. In the US, network congestion is managed according to the different existing electric power systems. In regions with vertically integrated utilities, where restructuring has not taken place, a procedure which physically manages constraints by rationing access to portions of the transmission network is used. This procedure is known as transmission loading relief (TLR). Other areas in the US function under Independent System Operators (ISO) or Regional Transmission Organizations (RTO), which generally use market-based methods to manage congestion and promote the expansion of the network. 2 In both types of systems, congestion problems have arisen, in particular since the beginning of restructuring. The frequency of TLRs (primarily in the midwest) has risen considerably, 3 while congestion costs have increased in the northeast systems (such as the PJM, Southern Connecticut and New England markets). Likewise, transmission investment has declined during several recent periods (Joskow, 2005) . The US regulator, FERC, has suggested policies on transmission investment based on the use of merchant transmission mechanisms, but not much effort has been carried out to apply performance-based regulatory mechanisms. Implementation of regulatory measures by the regulatory authority is further complicated by the duality of attributions at the federal and state levels. 4 Developing sufficient network extensions, particularly cross border capacities, is also urgently needed in Europe. Due to the liberalization processes initiated in the late 1990s, existing national electricity networks with limited cross-border capacities now form the backbone of the emerging European-wide internal market. However, the grid remains segmented into several regional and national subnetworks, resulting in little or no competition between countries, and the region as a whole is experiencing more congestion. The diverging policy approaches suggested for regulating transmission and managing congestion further complicate the development of a functioning electricity market. In 2 RTOs schedule and dispatch generators on regional networks, allocate scarce transmission capacity, monitoring generator, coordinate maintenance to transmission networks, plan ways to develop new transmission links, and operate real time and diverse time-ahead markets for energy and ancillary services. 3 By a factor of six during the 1998-2002 period. 4 The states are responsible for reviewing applications for major new transmission facilities, granting permits and regulating charges for bundled transmission service charged by vertically integrated firms to retail customers. FERC is responsible for regulating the prices for transmission service, but has in general no authority over transmission planning.
addition, the expected capacity increase in renewables (primarily offshore and onshore wind) will require significant transmission investment. Although several studies have proposed ambitious extension schedules for the existing grid (e.g. Dena, 2005) , an economical-technical approach that can cope with the increasing need for expansion while simultaneously accounting for welfare effects has not yet been designed. We propose that the HRV incentive mechanism is ideally suited to addressing these concerns.
After a brief theoretical overview, our paper is divided into three sections. First, we carry out a theoretical analysis of the cost function behavior of transmission expansion with simple structures (such as three-node meshed networks), and then extend them to more complex topologies. We focus on two basic cases: line capacities are adjusted, but nodes, lines, impedances and thus the power transmission distribution factors (PTDFs) do not change. Subsequently, we single out the effect of loop flows on costs by considering switched networks of the same topology (allowing for changes in line impedances that are correlated with line capacities) under several scale assumptions. These cases provide insights about the relationship between PTDFs and network topology size and shape. Second, we apply the HRV incentive mechanism to the theoretical network used for the first part of our analysis to derive its general behavior. We test the same differentiations made for the cost function analysis under the regulatory regime. Third, we apply the new incentive mechanism to a simplified grid (Germany, the Benelux and France) to test whether the theoretical conclusions we obtained are consistent with the application to a real-world situation.
Survey of the Literature
The two distinct theories of transmission investment take either a merchant approach (long-run financial rights to transmission, LTFTR), or a regulatory approach (incentive-regulation hypothesis).
The first is based on LTFTR auctions by an independent system operator (ISO). This approach is also known as a merchant mechanism because the participation of economic agents in auctions is voluntary. It addresses loop-flow externalities by having the ISO retain some unallocated transmission rights (or proxy FTRs) during the LTFTR auction to protect FTR holders from the negative externalities of transmission expansion projects (Kristiansen and Rosellon, 2006) . This is equivalent to having the agents responsible for externalities "pay" them back (Bushnell and Stoft, 1997) so that when FTR contracts exactly match dispatch, welfare cannot be reduced through gaming.
The regulatory approach involves a commercial transmission company (Transco) that is regulated through benchmark regulation or price regulation to provide long-term investment incentives while avoiding congestion. Some mechanisms suggest comparing the Transco's performance with a measure of welfare loss (Léautier, 2000 , Grande and Wangesteen, 2000 , and Joskow and Tirole, 2002 .
Another regulatory variation is the two-part tariff cap proposed by Vogelsang (2001) , where incentives for investment in expanding the grid derive from the rebalancing of the fixed and variable portions of the tariff. Vogelsang postulates transmission cost and demand functions with fairly general properties and then adapts regulatory adjustment processes to the electricity transmission problem. For example, under well-behaved cost and demand functions, appropriate weights (such as Laspeyres weights) grant convergence to equilibrium conditions. 5 A particular criticism of this approach has been that the properties of transmission cost and demand functions are little known but are suspected to differ from conventional functional forms. Hence Vogelsang's assumed cost and demand properties may actually not hold in a real network context with loop-flows. Furthermore, a conventional linear definition of the transmission output is in fact difficult since the physical flow through a meshed transmission network is complex and highly interdependent among transactions (Bushnell and Stoft, 1997 , and Hogan, 2002a , 2002b .
The new HRV mechanism combines the merchant and regulatory approaches in an environment of price-taking generators and loads. It is an extension of Vogelsang (2001) 2 Cost function behavior of transmission expansion
Outline
In this section we derive properties for electricity transmission cost functions. We identify types of network topologies where the expansion project derives from well-(or ill-) behaved transmission cost 5 See Rosellón (2007) for an application of the Vogelsang (2001) model to an electricity network with no loop flows. 6 Laspeyres weights are easily calculated and have shown nice economic properties under stable cost and demand conditions. Idealized weights correspond to perfectly predicted quantities and possess strong efficiency properties (see Laffont and Tirole, 1996, and Ramírez and Rosellón, 2002) . 7 Under Laspeyres weights (and assuming that cross-derivatives have the same sign), prices will intertemporally converge to marginal costs if goods are complementary and prices are initially above marginal costs.. When functions. In the first case, the expansion is such that only line capacities are adjusted, but nodes, lines, impedances and thus the PTDFs do not change. In the second case, the expansion considers switched networks of the same topology, allowing for changes in PTDFs and under several scale assumptions.
Our analysis of cost functions relies on a "translation" of the HRV's theoretical cost model into an empirically testable model. The HRV cost model defines cost function as the minimum costs necessary to produce each level of the FTR output subject to constraints on feasibility and on the relationship between FTR obligations and net injections: The objective of our model is to satisfy a given combination of FTRs by estimating the least-cost capacity extension. Due to the loop-flow characteristics of electricity networks, an increased injection at one node may result in a decreased capacity requirement for specific lines. In the second case, capacity extensions are linked to changes in the lines impedance resulting in a transformation of the grid's PTDF. Thus whenever the capacity value of one line is changed the entire power flow within the grid differs and may cause congestion elsewhere.
Our goal is to derive a "global" cost function in terms of the individual lines' costs. This is achieved by allowing one FTR output to move while keeping the others constant for the varied assumptions we make about the shape of individual-line cost functions.
Model approach
We incorporate the approach described into GAMS as a non-linear minimization problem, with the overall grid extension costs as an objective function. We use the DC Load Flow model to calculate power flows. Based on the assumption that real power flows are determined according to the differences of the voltage angles between two nodes, we can model the real flow by focusing only on the voltage angle differences (Stigler and Todem, 2005, and Schweppe et al., 1988) . Doing so will 
The values of a and b have been varied for different scenarios, and c is assumed to be 0. A realistic line extension function may be a combination of the three modeled cases (although linear extension costs are commonly used). We note the possibility of lumpiness of investments and spikes within the extension functions (e.g. due to a change in voltage level) (see also Section 2.3.3).
Our initial grid topology comprises a three-node network with two generation nodes and one demand node ( Figure 1 ). We define two FTRs: from node 1 to 3 and from node 2 to 3. Both vary between 1 MW and 10 MW respectively to estimate the resulting global cost function. For the first part of the analysis we use a greenfield approach: lines reactances are given and fixed and the starting values for the line capacities are zero. Thus, for each incremental FTR we must construct the necessary capacity amount.
We alter the approach for the second part of our analysis when capacity and reactances are linked. The functional connection between capacity extensions and line characteristics B ij (k ij ) is derived from the laws of parallel circuits. 10 We assume that a doubling of capacity results in a bisection of a line reactance. Thus, starting values for the line capacities k ij with a value of zero would result in an impossibility of any extension so we select starting values per line that allow a relatively high initial level of congestion and that are further reduced in the alternative case. Thus, the initial grid can only cover small amounts of FTRs (see Table 1 ). To further analyze the impact of loop-flow lines, we use 8 Hereafter referred to as "extension function" whereas C(FTR) is referred to as "cost function". a second configuration consisting of a meshed six-node network ( Figure 2 ) and adjust the FTRs accordingly.
Due to the numerical nature of the model, we cannot make general predictions for cost functions applicable to any electricity network configuration, because specific grid configurations will produce quite different results. Nevertheless, by applying different scenarios for two different FTRs, we want to derive the functional behavior of extensions that can support general conclusions. Table 1 gives an overview of our simulation. 
Fixed line reactances
The first part of the cost function analysis only considers the capacity extension while the grid's topology is fixed in terms of line reactances and available connections. Varying the FTRs has an exogenously determined impact on the power flow pattern. Hence, our model only calculates the minimum capacity amount needed to exactly fulfill this pattern. The outcomes therefore resemble the loop-flow nature of real-world networks.
In the symmetric three-node case, line 1 (between nodes 1 and 2) is subject to power flows in opposite directions depending on the value of the two FTRs. Given a fixed level of one FTR, an increase in the second FTR will first lead to a decrease in the flow on line 1 towards zero until both FTRs have the same value. Afterwards, the flow will again increase, although in the opposite direction. The resulting cost for increasing the FTR value will show a "kink" at the level of the fixed FTR ( Extending our model to six nodes according to the FTR combination subjects five lines to counterflows. Since lines 2, 5 and 6 are symmetric, their counter-flows will "kink" at the same level. The resulting global cost function can have three kinks according to the FTR combinations. In comparing the six-and the three-node networks, the quadratic extension function still results in an always-increasing feasibility range while the logarithmic function has a decreasing global cost function according to the FTR combination. However, the linear extension function also now has decreasing elements ( Figure 5 ) in the global costs function, especially when increasing the cost parameters for loop-flow lines (asymmetric case). In other words, by extending a specific FTR, the simultaneous increase of further FTRs can reduce the overall costs in meshed networks. However, this will not always be achieved because the necessary counter-flow generating FTRs may not be needed and the positive effect of the additional net injections will not be obtained. 
Variable line reactances
In reality, there are limitations to extending a line's capacity without altering its added technical characteristics. Normally, a capacity extension is linked to a change in the reactance of the line.
Therefore, for the second part of our analysis, we assume that doubling a line's capacity results in a reduction of its reactance by the factor 0.5 (based on the law of parallel circuits). We observe that the starting values of the lines' capacities are necessary but that they will prevent making a direct comparison to our first approach that uses fixed-line reactances.
Using the simple three-node case and a starting capacity of 2 MW on each line, the resulting cost functions do not necessarily have a kink when one FTR is fixed. In addition, all lines start with zero extension costs since the first portion of the FTR increase can be accomplished with the existing grid ( Figure 6 ). However, the cost function can still have kinks but these do not necessarily relate to a specific loop-flowed line. Discontinuities can also be caused by changing grid conditions as the same 
Conclusion
The results of our cost function analyses reveal the difficulties that electricity networks present when applying standard approaches. Even for a simple extension, loop-flows within the system can lead to mathematically problematical global cost function behaviors. We observe that the linkage between capacity extension and line reactances (and thus the flow patterns) produces complex results that are highly sensitive to the underlying grid structure. None of the three tested extension functions can fully reproduce realistic extension structures since these are subject to lumpiness and external influences (e.g. geographical conditions) that can cause dysfunctional behaviors with sudden slope changes. The assumption of linear extension costs is acceptable when considering line length; however with respect to capacity increase, a lumpy function with constant costs for corresponding voltage levels and circuit number is required.
For modeling purposes, the logarithmic behavior appears to produce a high degree of nonlinearities with non-smooth behavior, and demands more intense calculations and solver capabilities. Quadratic functions show a generally continuous behavior that makes them suitable for modeling purposes.
Linear extension functions fall between the logarithmic and quadratic cases. However, the piecewise, linear nature of the resulting global costs function makes the derivation of global optima feasible; in combination with the advantages of retaining linear functions, this is preferred for modeling purposes and is compatible with the realistic extension costs neglecting lumpiness.
3 The regulatory two-part tariff model
Outline
Next we analyze the implementation of the HRV regulatory model to determine if it can provide incentives for efficient expansion. We estimate the impact of different assumptions regarding grid parameters and topology, again with and without PTDF changes. As in Section 3, we translate the HRV theoretical regulatory model (Hogan, Rosellón, and Vogelsang, 2007, pp. 13-19) 
where: q t = the net injections in period t (FTRs are derived from: We note that the proposed price cap index (7) is defined for two-part tariffs as a variable fee t τ and a fixed fee F where the output is incremental LTFTRs. The weighted number of consumers N t is assumed to be determined exogenously. When the demand and optimized cost functions are differentiated, the first order optimality conditions are:
Model approach
We view this incentive-regulatory mechanism as a maximization problem with complementarity constraints (MPEC) model that incorporates both a profit-maximizing Transco subject to the two-part tariff constraint and a perfectly competitive wholesale nodal pricing market. The Transco's revenue consists of the collected congestion rents and the fixed part of the tariff, and its expenses are the network investment costs. By choosing a specific extension level, the Transco has an impact on flow patterns and market prices and consequently on its own revenue.
For a first application of the HRV regulatory model we alter our approach to allow for a straightforward implementation into GAMS. The objective function of the Transco covers the collectable congestion rent in terms of point-to-point price differences (∆p ij ) in a nodal pricing market and its fixed fee minus the extension costs for the grid:
The sum of the variable and fixed revenues is subject to a Laspeyere weighted price cap as proposed in equation (7). The time horizon is assumed to be ten periods. The first period is considered to define the starting values for the price cap and no extension measurements are allowed in. We also assume that the starting value of F has an impact on the outcome by allowing the Transco a higher starting basis for grid extensions. The Transco's maximization problem is subject to a market equilibrium that defines the outcome of the nodal pricing market. We assume a welfare maximizing ISO that balances demand and generation, given network constraints: Similar to the cost function analysis, we use a three-node network to test the HRV regulatory model for a fixed-PTDF grid and then for a linkage of line capacities and reactances. To mathematically simplify the analysis, we introduce linear demand functions at each node with a slope of -1 and a maximum demand of 10 at a price of 0. To resemble the situation of our cost function analysis, we still assume that node 3 depends on the grid for supply. Generation capacities at node 1 and 2 are assumed to be unrestricted and have no marginal generation costs. Thus the demand at these nodes should always be at maximum level and supplied by local generation.
Since the first period defines the price cap, we expect that the results strongly depend on the chosen starting conditions, in particular the starting capacities of the lines. To test the impact of the starting conditions we also consider a second approach using asymmetric generation costs. Table 2 summarizes the calculated scenarios. 
Results
Fixed line reactances
When using symmetric generation facilities, the obtained results of linear, quadratic, and logarithmic extension functions do not differ significantly in the fixed network. Prices at node 1 and 2 stay at zero thus equaling the marginal generation costs. The price at node 3 starts from either 6 €/MWh or 8 €/MWh depending on the starting line capacities and drops to about 5 €/MWh for all of the remaining periods. With the exception of the quadratic function, only one extension measurement is undertaken in period 2. In the quadratic case, extensions take place in each period although strongly decreasing in absolute values. However, the sum of the extended capacity is nearly equal for all three extension cases.
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For the asymmetric case, the results differ when we change the cost parameters of generation. The price at node 1 remains at its marginal costs level for all scenarios. In other words, the modeled Transco has no incentive to increase line capacities to allow for a price reduction due to the cheaper generation at node 2. Prices at node 3 again change according to the extended capacities The quadratic extension function still results in a generally decreasing extension over all periods. The linear and logarithmic functions result in one, two or three price jumps and related extension measurements. The price at node 3 can drop to as low a value of 2 €/MWh for some of the scenarios. The total sum of extensions therefore is not constant as in the symmetric case, which could be a result of the greater non linearity resulting from asymmetric generation and non smooth extension functions. As time is not accounted for at full economic scale within the model the Transco is indifferent about revenues in 13 It is not evident why the quadratic case shows a significant different behavior than the other two cases. A further nonintuitive result is that increasing the starting value for the fixed-part of the tariff does not alter the results. present or future periods which might influence the obtained results. Again, introducing a starting fixed-part of the tariff does not alter the general outcome.
Variable line reactances
Under base case conditions with 2 MW starting line capacities, symmetric generation, and no fixedpart of the tariff, the resulting price and extension patterns in the first period resemble the expectations of a price decrease towards marginal costs. While prices tend towards marginal generation cost due to increasing line extensions, the loss of congestion rent is compensated for by increasing the returns of the fixed-part of the tariff (Figure 9 ). The results for linear and logarithmic extension functions show only small differences whereas the quadratic case has a slightly different functional form towards the last periods with a further steady decrease. Reducing the starting capacity does not vary the results although the absolute values differ. The extension schedule for the quadratic case is symmetric for all periods. By contrast for linear and logarithmic extension functions, the values are chiefly symmetric or focuson the capacity of a single one line.
Introducing asymmetric generation costs leads to a significant divergence in the functional form of the quadratic extension case whereas the other two extensions cases remain rather stable ( Figure 10 ). The price at node 1 with its higher marginal generation costs and the price at node 2 decrease. In the linear and logarithmic cases the price at node 2 moves towards 0 starting in period 3. In the quadratic case the price decrease starts in period 7 but also reaches 0 in period 10. Altering the starting value of the fixed-part of the tariff does not change the results again and decreasing the starting capacity changes the absolute value but not the general behavior. The extension schedule of the quadratic case is more consistent since it continuously extends lines 1 and 2. In the linear and logarithmic extension cases, capacities increase with the larger amounts in the first periods which explains the divergence of the price figures. The total amount of extension is similar in all three cases.
The major difference between the static and variable line reactances is the non-existent price movement in the first case. Furthermore, the fixed-part of the tariff is not altered during the periods.
Thus the Transco extends only to prevent changes in the initial congestion rent value even though more energy is transmitted. The missing possibility of changing the grid's flow pattern in effect limits the Transco's choices to the observed ones. In reality, capacity extension is generally linked to changes in a network's flow characteristics, making the second part of our analysis particularly relevant. Altering the original postulated myopic assumption of the Transco may also bias the results.
A Transco that maximizes repeatedly in one period may have very different incentives from one that considers all periods. However, a periodic approach may still be more appropriate. 
Outline
We now test the theoretical insights obtained. Figure 11 illustrates a simplified grid connecting Germany, the Benelux, and France as presented in Ehrenmann et al. (2006) . The modeled market is designed as a nodal pricing system, characterized by high prices in the Benelux, intermediate prices in
Germany, and relatively low prices in France. The simplified transmission network gives a good "snapshot" of the European market's congestion problems. 
Results
We modeled a ten-period run and achieve an extensive network extension program that leads to price convergence at the marginal costs level of coal units (Figure 12 ). The fixed-part of the tariff increases in a similar fashion to the cases presented in Section 3.3.2. The Transco's profit increases during the periods, starting at 950 mn € per year, and reaching 2.5 bn € in the last period. Thus the chosen Laspeyres weights allow a significant revenue increase for the Transco.
The extension amount totals an additional 14.2 GW, or nearly 43% of the system's initial line capacity. The relatively low total investment of about 140 mn is explained by our assumption that the extension cost functions represent system upgrades only and no new connections are build. The geographic extent of the extensions ( Figure 13 ) resembles expectations drawn from the nodal price differences, particularly between France and Belgium. However, some of the measures appear to represent necessary back-up extensions to allow for specific flow patterns between France and Germany and within Germany.
The consumer surplus in the system also changes according to the price development. Due to the large demand levels in France which faces higher prices after the extensions, the surplus decreases by 1%.
We observe that although the overall congestion nearly vanishes, the increased consumer surplus in the Benelux is insufficient to offset the decrease in France. However, looking at the social welfare including consumer and producer surplus of the wholesale market, we see an increase of 1.7% (equal to almost 1.6 bn € annually).
These preliminary results show that the HRV mechanism has the potential to foster investment in congested networks in a welfare-improving direction. However, more analysis is necessary to estimate the impact of externalities (e.g. wind input and generation extensions) on the Transco's behavior.
Furthermore, the extension functions and restrictions must be adjusted to more completely reflect real conditions, especially the lumpiness of investments. These adjustments may result in serious modeling problems due to the non-linear and non-smooth nature of the impacts. Political and administrative issues to be addressed include property-right issues and existing, long-term transaction contracts. Extension between t5 and t1 Extension between t10 and t5
Conclusions
This paper presents a combination of the merchant-FTR and the regulatory approaches to transmission expansion in a competitive environment of price-taking generators and loads. We are interested in the application of incentive mechanisms and their compatibility with merchant investment in organized electricity markets with FTRs.
The paper discusses three distinct topics and our preliminary results. First, the general cost function behavior in electricity networks is analyzed. Due to the loop-flow nature of meshed networks, a high level of complexity, non linearity and discontinuities exist. We apply increasing, linear, and decreasing extension functions for lines within a network in order to derive the global cost function when increasing the FTR in the system. The results indicate that the high level of kinks resulting from loop-flows on lines diminishes when line capacity extensions are linked to line reactances (i.e.
changing the flow pattern within the network whenever it is extended). However, the resulting global cost functions still show a high level of nonlinearity, and complicating the derivation of global optima in model approaches.
Second we implement a regulatory mechanism as an MPEC problem with a profit maximizing Transco and a fully competitive wholesale market based on nodal pricing. Starting with a congested grid, the Transco is free to choose grid extensions that influence its own profit (the congestion rent and a fixed fee). The Transco's profits are subject to a price cap with Laspeyres weights. The results show that the Transco extends the network and that prices converge towards marginal costs over the periods.
Third, we test the MPEC approach using the simplified grid of Northwestern Europe with a realistic generation structure. This first application of the HRV mechanism to a real world situation yields outcomes similar to our theoretical analyses; the nodal prices that were subject to a high level of congestion in the first phase converge towards a common price level representing the marginal generation costs.
We suggest that additional analyses are necessary to verify the obtained results and general conclusions presented. At a minimum, they should include improving the underlying model structure with respect to myopic behavior; varying the weights in the price-cap constraint; altering the time periods; employing variable pricing mechanisms (particularly zonal pricing); and examining the impacts of additional Transcos within one network.
